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ABSTRACT 
Universities require resources to support research, and often seek 
funds from the private sector. Given the rising trend towards partner-
ships with the corporate sector, what is the best strategy for universities 
to adopt to commercialize intellectual property? This paper sketches the 
extent of commercial izat ion of research in Canadian universit ies, 
explains why copyright enforcement is difficult, and discusses the bene-
fits and disadvantages of licensing an innovation versus creating a spin-
off company to exploit university discoveries. Because the university 
and the corporate sector have different objectives, two important ques-
tions are: how to structure an incentive compatible "contractual arrange-
ment" to accommodate both parties, and how to share the benefits of 
university discoveries. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les appuis financiers sont nécessaire pour les recherches en milieu 
universitaires, et il faut souvent chercher ces appuis dans le secteur 
pr ivé. Etant donné la tendance actuelle aux partenariats avec les 
entreprises privées, quelle est la meilleure stratégie qui permette aux 
universités de mettre sur le marché leur propriété intellectuelle? Cette 
* I would like to thank R. Clifton, J. Halliwell and R. Perry for helpful guidance and dis-
cussion. I dedicate this article to my longtime friend and colleague Sid Gilbert (1943-
99), who contributed much to higher education scholarship in Canada. 
114 D.Hum 
étude examine le degré de rentabilisation de la recherche dans les 
universités canadiennes, expliquera la difficulté de la mise en vigueur 
des lois relatives au copywright, et discute des avantages et désavantages 
soi t de b reve te r une invent ion soit de créer une succursa le af in 
d'exploiter des découvertes universitaires. L'université et le secteur privé 
ayan t des o b j e c t i f s d i f f é r e n t s , on doi t sou lever deux ques t ions 
importantes: comment structurer un "accord contractuel" promettant des 
incitations financières satisfaisantes pour les deux parties; et comment 
partager les avantages de découvertes faites à l'université. 
Introduction 
Canad ian un ivers i t i es requi re immense resources to suppor t 
research, and frequently seek funds from the private sector, either as 
unconditional donations or in the form of research contracts. Either way, 
university research often produces knowledge or products with commer-
cial potential, at which point this "knowledge" might be described as 
"intellectual property." Given the rising trend towards collaboration with 
the corporate sector, what are the benefits to universities of commercial-
izing intellectual property? What is the best strategy for universities to 
adopt? Nowhere are the colliding financial and academic issues more 
dramatically illustrated for Canadians than in two newspaper articles 
published within two weeks of each other. On October 22, 1998, the 
Globe and Mail published a lengthy feature on technology, outlining the 
trend of academics "to rush to the private sector to propel their ideas 
from the lab to the drugstore." The article described the universities' 
imperative to accelerate the rate of discovery, develop commercial spin-
off companies, generate licensing royalties, and increase the equity value 
of un ive r s i ty -owned corpora t ions . Less than two weeks later on 
November 2, 1998, the same Globe and Mail reported on the "Olivieri 
affair," in which a medical researcher at Toronto's Hospital for Sick 
Chi ldren work ing under contract to a commercia l drug company 
reported that a drug under trial posed a risk to her patients. Dr Olivieri's 
fight with the drug company to release these findings, and the repercus-
sions of her stand with colleagues, hospital administration as well as the 
corporate sector received much publicity.1 
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Meanwhile, the debate has also heightened between government and 
the academic community. A report by an expert panel to the prime min-
ister's Advisory Council on Science and Technology recommended that 
faculty receiving federal research grants be required to disclose any 
potential commercial application of their work or face having their funds 
cut off (Industry Canada, 1999). The panel's position that the goal of 
federally funded university research is to enhance the capacity of the pri-
vate sector rather than "produce any new revenue streams for universi-
ties" met with strong condemnation from the Canadian Association of 
University Teachers (CAUT) and academics, fearing that Canadian uni-
versities would become "publicly subsidized laboratories for private 
businesses."2 The federal report limited its scope solely to intellectual 
property resulting from federally funded research; that is, it ignored 
completely intellectual property financed, in whole or in part, by private 
corporations, stating simply that these "...should be left to the universi-
ties and the private sector to negotiate..." (Industry Canada, 1999, p. 1) 
In short, the report had nothing to say about the relationship between 
universities and the private sector, nor how universities might deal with 
this issue of increasing importance. 
This paper outlines some of the strategic considerations facing uni-
versities in developing a policy stance towards commercializing intellec-
tual property. The next two sections define more precisely what is 
officially included in the term "intellectual property," and describe the 
extent of commercial activities taking place in Canadian universities. 
Following sections discuss issues of copyright and piracy, and the options 
of licensing technology versus creating a spin-off company. Finally, a 
"principal-agent" framework is adopted to explore incentive features for 
the university, first as agent, and then alternatively, as principal. 
Knowledge as Intellectual Property 
What universities commonly regard as "knowledge" is now increas-
ingly called "intellectual property" to signify its commercial potential. 
The term "intellectual property" refers to inventions, computer software, 
literary works, books and papers, industrial designs, trademarks, 
integrated circuit topologies, new plant varieties, and other ideas, 
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products, processes, compositions, and the like which are patentable, pro-
tectable by copyright, trademark registration, or trade secret agreement.3 
Universities also have specific institutions to manage intellectual 
property and its development. Often there are offices to encourage and 
solicit research grants from government and industry, to identify and 
protect discoveries (patenting, registering, etc), and to promote (via mar-
ket studies, prototype development, etc) university intellectual property. 
These activities are undertaken in institutions with names such as: Office 
of Research, University-Industry Relations, Centres of Applied Research, 
Technology Transfer Offices, and the like.4 
The activities of such offices are expanding because an important 
dimension of intellectual property management is its commercialization; 
that is, the licensing, research contracting, consulting, and spin-off 
investing activity, whether carried out in departments, research parks, or 
university-housed companies.5 Commercialization of intellectual prop-
erty raises a variety of issues for universities, including such questions 
as: developing policies concerning faculty who consult for fee, undertak-
ing of research contracts using university facilities or personnel, assign-
ing ownership of intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents 
and registrations, sharing of revenues arising from licensing activities, 
agreeing to honour trade secret agreements upon termination, etc., as 
well as the important issue surrounding academic freedom for faculty. 
Commercialization of Research in Canadian Universities 
What is the extent of research commercialization by universities in 
Canada?6 Data gathered recently reveal that during the fiscal year 
1997-98, Canadian universities filed 320 patents, negotiated 195 new 
licenses with outside organizations, and created 37 spin-off companies. 
Sixty percent of Canadian universities actively manage their intellectual 
property, and as one indicator of activity, 44 percent of universities have 
applied for at least one patent during the past five years. To glimpse the 
extent of past efforts over the past five years (the survey reference 
period), the total number of licenses was 672, and the total number of 
spin-off companies created by universities was 312. Universities received 
royalties of $11.5 million from active licenses in 1997-98, or about 
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$17,000 per license; universities also hold equity in 42% of the spin-off 
companies for a total of $17 million. About one-half (47%) of spin-off 
companies were created solely to license technology. Two more points 
are worthy of note. The rate of spin-off company creation is increasing 
over time, with about 30% of those with known dates of creation occur-
ring in the last three years: 1995-1998. Second, most of these spin-off 
companies are confined to only four fields. The four fields of biotechnol-
ogy, health sciences, engineering and applied sciences, and mathematical 
and physical sciences account for 78% of the spin-off companies.7 
To place this activity in some perspective, we can compare it with 
that of the ten federal departments and agencies that engage in natural 
science and engineering-based research activities (including Health 
Canada, National Research Council, and the Canadian Space Agency, 
among others).8 During the same period (fiscal 1997-98), these depart-
ments filed 233 patent applications, signed 398 licenses with other orga-
nizat ions, and generated $7 mill ion in annual royalt ies. In short, 
Canadian universities filed more patents (320 versus 233), signed fewer 
licenses (195 versus 398) but earned more royalties ($11.5 million ver-
sus $7 million) than these ten federal departments.9 Consequently, uni-
versities may be characterized as "more significant" for developing 
commercial intellectual property to the extent that they have more patent 
activity and more royalty income. And it is likely that the present pattern 
of commercializing intellectual property will hold in future. If so, what 
are the strategic considerations that universities ought to bear in mind 
when dealing with the private sector? 
Copyright and the Economics of Intellectual Piracy 
The management of intellectual property includes, among other 
things, developing university policies on copyrights and trademarks. 
Copyrights have not been a major concern for universities in the past. 
Faculty members producing materials such as books (including texts), 
articles, recordings, and the like have usually been allowed to hold copy-
right personally for good reasons. First, copyright in Canada is automati-
cally assigned to the creator. However, there are also economic reasons 
why universities might not care to claim and register copyrights. A book 
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or recording is costly and difficult to create, but easily and cheaply 
reproduced; furthermore, the reproduction may be indistinguishable 
from the original, in terms of functionality. Accordingly, unauthorized 
copying of textual material and the like will occur for profit unless it is 
legally forbidden. With competition to provide unauthorized copies, and 
a fine, F, imposed on those caught with probability, p, it can be easily 
shown that the scale of unauthorized copying is independent of the size 
of fine, F, but that the price is proportional to the size of fine, F. In short, 
the size of the fine is simply incorporated into the price of the copied 
book or recording, without affecting the amount of unauthorized copy-
ing. (Varian, 1996, p. 600) But the production and development costs, K, 
are not trivial, as any author or composer or inventor will testify. It can 
be further shown that the size of the expected fine to deter unauthorized 
copying is related to the market share of the copier and the production 
costs, K. (Varian, 1996, p. 598-601) Since the bulk of development costs 
for copyright material is typically borne by the individual creator rather 
than the university per se, and the enforcement costs (that is, detection 
and legal remedy costs) against unauthorized copying can be substantial, 
it is not surprising that universities typically forego any residual claim to 
copyright, and instead, grant it to the creators.10 Any university holding 
copyright but did not enforce unauthorized reproduction would erode its 
credibility in asserting other claims of intellectual property protection." 
Much the same considerations apply to trademarks, although universities 
decry unauthorized uses of their symbols, designs and logos. However, 
commercial considerations are typically not at issue.12 In sum, the issue 
of copyrighting textual, instructional or recorded material is quite differ-
ent from other forms of intellectual property. Ease of piracy and high 
enforcement costs are the primary reasons why universities probably 
have little interest in asserting copyright ownership. 
It is, rather, in terms of licensing and creating spin-off companies to 
exploit intellectual property commercially that the challenges lie. Two 
issues that universities must confront are discussed; the first is whether to 
license a new discovery to an outside commercial organization or to 
establish a spin-off university company; and the second is how to share 
and use the financial rewards from commercializing intellectual property. 
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To License or Spin-off 
Commercial exploitation of new discovery through licensing or 
trademarking is a relatively clean and low transaction cost strategy for 
universities. No large development costs need be assigned to market 
development, and it may even be argued on principle, that it is not the 
university's mission to play entrepreneur.13 Furthermore, as argued 
above, enforcement costs can be substantial, and a licensing strategy 
shifts these costs and responsibilities to the licensee. The main benefit of 
this strategy would appear to be confined to the stream of income gener-
ated by annual royalties, which, according to latest data, amount to about 
$17,000 per license. However, the pace and scale at which commercial 
development proceeds is completely taken out of university hands. 
Creating a spin-off company to commercialize technology is more 
risky, costly, uncertain and even bothersome than licensing. The poten-
tial benefits, corresponding, are greater since spin-off firms can provide 
revenues to fund further research and development, provide various uni-
versity services, train and teach future researchers, as well as grant 
licenses for royalty. In sum, a greater range of benefits and control is 
possible. Although about half (47%) of spin-off companies were created 
solely to license technology, this also means that about half of the spin-
off companies had broader objectives as well. Although the total value 
of equity held by universities in spin-off companies is small (about $ 17 
million), this is understating the importance of this strategy since a spin-
off company will have access to financial markets through public share 
offerings which universities, qua universities, do not. Furthermore, some 
might even wish to argue that if commercialization of new technology 
requires assumption of risk, then the market test of raising share capital 
is the appropriate one, not government funding agencies or university 
officials acting in committee. Data tracking university spin-off compa-
nies are scarce but early indications reveal that spin-off companies are 
increasing, that many are in different stages of maturation, and only 12% 
are known to be inactive. (Statistics Canada, Preliminary Release 
Oct. 29, 1998). The generalization seems warranted that research-
intensive universities in Canada are becoming more attracted to the spin-
off model.14 
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Two fundamental questions are at issue. First, how should the indus-
try-university relationship or "contract" be structured so as to be "incen-
tive-compatible"; that is, to accommodate two different parties with 
different aims and motivating behaviours? Second, what is the appropri-
ate sharing relationship between the "inventor" (or university) and the 
"commercializer" (private firm or university spin-off company)? These 
are not easy questions, so it is best to acknowledge that no claim of a 
comprehensive treatment is made; that for the most part, the perspective 
will be that of the university rather than the commercial firm; and that 
the focus will be on the broad considerations of the "contract" or "rela-
tionship" design. In the economics literature, this approach is termed 
principal-agency analysis. A "principal" is simply one who must induce 
an "agent" to perform some task when monitoring is difficult or impossi-
ble, and full information is not available. It is necessary to consider both 
parties; and the university may be either "principal" or "agent" depend-
ing upon circumstances. 
The Corporation as Principal: the University as Agent 
C o n s i d e r the fo l l owing charac te r iza t ion of the co rpora t ion-
researcher relationship. The Corporation is the "principal"; it is inter-
ested in commercializing technical discoveries (x) for profit, 7t(x), which 
is random since, among other things, it depends on discoveries of x. 
The Researcher (or University) is the "agent" which must expend effort 
towards discovering x with no guarantee of success. Furthermore, to 
simplify, the researcher may choose a level of effort, eL or eH, with the 
condition that only eH (high effort level) leads to discoveries of x. 
Finally, assume that the corporation is risk-neutral because, for example, 
it has adequate wealth to withstand fluctuations in its profits, but the 
researcher is risk-adverse, owing to low levels of wealth, say. This sim-
ple characterization captures the essential characteristics concerning the 
commerc ia l i za t ion of intel lectual proper ty created by univers i ty 
research. It captures the notions that: effort must be expended to make 
discoveries, commercial discoveries are not guaranteed, and corporations 
are in a better position than universities to bear financial risk. How should 
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the corporation design a contract which maximizes corporate profits 
while encouraging maximum innovation from university researchers? 
The key factor is the non-observability of research effort by the cor-
poration. For instance, if research effort were observable, the corpora-
tion could simply specify the researcher perform effort level eH (rather 
than eL) and thereby generate discoveries x, and the Corporation could 
guarantee a fixed payment w to the university. This case is uninterest-
ing. On the other hand, if the researcher were risk-neutral, then it is still 
optimal for the Corporation to negotiate a fixed w contract since risk-
sharing for the researcher also disappears as a consideration. This case 
is also uninteresting. 
The interesting case arises when effort is unobservable, as is likely 
the situation when researchers are given academic freedom to work at 
their own pace and to explore avenues considered most promising; and 
when researchers are risk-adverse; that is, not willing to bear the risk of 
having their payments w depend, essentially, upon a random variable, 7t. 
However, this "interesting" case is the most complex, and it can be 
shown that under these circumstances (a) the optimal incentive contract 
will not be monotonically increasing in profits, implying that a formula 
linking researchers' rewards to Corporation profits is not straight for-
ward; and (b) by implication, the optimal contract is unlikely to take a 
simple linear form; that is, a fixed-percentage-of-profits rule (Mas-
Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995, p. 477 ff.). Nonetheless, despite the 
difficulty of saying something simple and universally applicable, it is 
still useful to recall the lesson of the above analysis. It is this: when 
research effort is unobservable, and researchers are risk-adverse (the 
most reasonable assumptions to make, it seems), the contractual relation 
which induces research effort level of eH (and thus inducing discoveries x) 
is one which gives the researchers (or univers i ty) a share of the 
Corporation profits. 
The University as Principal: the Corporation as Agent 
Before one is tempted to conclude that the best strategy for universi-
ties seeking to commercialize intellectual property is to form spin-off 
companies or joint ventures with corporations in order to gain a share of 
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the profits, one must consider the question of "adverse selection." Let us 
set aside the assumption that universities are risk adverse; instead 
assume that they are risk neutral in order to highlight additional compli-
cations. Consider now the problem from the perspective of the university 
or researcher (rather than the Corporation). The researcher has made an 
independent technical discovery (that is, not contractual with a corporate 
funder) and thus owns a "specific" asset, termed "intellectual property." 
However, the researcher has no venture capital, marketing experience or 
expertise on commercial networks. Corporations, on the other hand, pos-
sess the "specific" asset called marketing talent and experience, but do 
not own the technical discovery. How should the university commercial-
ize its intellectual property? What sort of contractual arrangement is 
best? What is the best "price" to set for the discovery?15 
If corporations are large and financially strong, they are probably 
risk neutral, and therefore willing to bear marketing risks. It might 
appear, then, that researchers should simply sell their inventions to cor-
porations for a "high and fair" price. But universities must guard against 
the phenomenon of adverse selection. Firms have better information 
about the market potential and industrial production costs of commer-
cializing the invention, x, than universities. Therefore, firms will refuse 
the university's asking price when sale estimates are low, and accept the 
price when sale estimates are high. Thus, the university can only sell x 
when the asking price is lower than expected profitability. Because of 
this "adverse selection" phenomenon, the university will not receive the 
full market value of its invention, if it chooses not to commercialize the 
invention itself. 
What are the other alternatives? If the university licenses the discov-
ery for a royalty payment per unit sold, the researcher may be asked to 
bear an unacceptable level of risk (we assume the mission of the 
researcher is not primarily entrepreneurial); and the corporation's incen-
tives to commercialize is also blunted. If the university licenses the 
discovery for a share of the profits (as discussed above), then the univer-
sity will have difficulty monitoring, let alone controlling, costs, since 
production and marketing costs are the prerogative of the Corporation. 
These (perhaps unnecessarily) high costs can affect overall, and thus the 
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university's share of, net profits from commercializing the invention. 
Again, the objectives of the university and the corporation diverge. It is 
not possible, again, to reach a simple and universally applicable solution. 
The insight offered in this situation of potential adverse selection is for 
the university to offer the corporation a high price for outright purchase, 
or a lower license fee with royalties tied to sales. 
To summarize, with the corporation as principal seeking to motivate 
the university as agent, reasonable assumptions suggest that some sort of 
link to profits might be optimal. However, with the inventor as principal 
and the commercial exploiter as agent, adverse selection considerations 
might argue for licensing and royalty structures. For those distressed by 
not receiving unambiguous guidance, more definite results can only 
come from detailed examination of specific cases. Our discussion serves 
merely to highlight some considerations upon which differing strategies 
might recommend themselves; it remains for universities to examine 
thoroughly the particular circumstances of each intellectual property. 
Concluding Remarks 
Ownership of intellectual property is the source of financial return to 
research effort but intellectual piracy is a major problem due to the tech-
nical ease of reproduction for some works such as books and recordings. 
Other forms of intellectual property require huge development costs as 
well as commercial partners for market dissemination. 
One task of the university is to exploit the connection between basic 
research and commercial potential through managing its intellectual 
property. This implies active partnering with private corporations, and 
negotiating the best arrangements between faculty and university admin-
istration on the one hand, and university management and private corpo-
rations on the other. This will require developing strategies for patents, 
copyrights, spin-off companies, royalty arrangements and other means. 
Commercialization of basic research is expensive and requires skills 
well beyond those possessed by universities. 
But more than mere money is at stake. It is, rather, the greater chal-
lenge of forging a congruence between competing cultures. Universities 
often conduct research for non-commercial reasons. Researchers are as 
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motivated by the recognition of priority of discovery and the practice of 
eponymy than either stock options or royalties. Discovery remains the 
core mission of university research. Corporations, on the other hand, are 
motivated by profits and the challenges of product development and 
market risk. The university and corporate cultures will inevitably clash. 
It is hoped that enough sincere goodwill will emerge to forge the neces-
sary strategic alliances required for all parties to co-operate for the pub-
lic g o o d . ^ 
Notes 
1 Dr Oliveri's circumstances are detailed in a cover story by Maclean's 
magazine, November 16, 1998. See also the follow up discussion in Maclean's, 
December 21, 1998, pp. 83-84. Controversy continues to surround this case. 
2 "CAUT deplores Final Expert Panel Report" CAUT Bulletin, 46(6), June 
1999. See also commentary by Neil Tudiver, "Growing Commercial Pressures 
Endanger Academic Freedom and University Autonomy" , CA UT Bulletin, 
46(6), p. 4. Press treatment is given in "Business needs first grab at research: 
panel," Globe and Mail, June 3, 1999, p. A3. 
^ For detailed discussion of these definitions, see Respondent Handbook, 
Survey of Intellectual Property Commercialization in the Higher Education 
Sector, 1998 . Statistics Canada. 
^ One of my colleagues, a former Dean of Law, has suggested that a good 
measure of the importance attached by universities to the commercialization of 
intellectual property might be the amount of legal fees they pay to patent lawyers. 
^ An example of how the evolving role of academics, industry and govern-
ment is viewed is the 1996-97 annual report of the president of MIT, admittedly 
an institution whose mission is directed towards industry-university partnership 
for economic and commercial objectives. See Vest (1997). 
6 Information is drawn from the Survey of Intellectual Property 
Commercialization in the Higher Education Sector, 1998. At this writing, infor-
mation is from preliminary releases dated October 7, 1998 and October 29, 1998. 
1 The other fields are: education, fine and applied arts, humanities, social 
sciences, commerce and management, engineering technology and trades, and 
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"other." The classification employs Statistics Canada's Census Field of Study, 
which groups 123 detailed fields into 11 general fields for technical colleges as 
well as universities. 
® Comparison of university activity in commercializing intellectual proper-
ty (IP) with that of federal departments who also develop IP may strike some as 
strange. One can hardly compare universities with the corporate sector whose 
primary mission is to create commercial products. Presumably, the federal 
departments' research effort is not to create commercial IP in the first instance, 
and thus, they are more similar to universities than the private sector. Of course, 
no account is taken of different amounts of resources and budgets. 
^ Preliminary data release (October 7, 1998) of Annex to Federal Science 
Expenditures and Personnel 1998/99 Survey. Statistics Canada. 
' 0 For example, The University of Manitoba's policy has a single sentence 
on the subject of copyrights to writings: "The University acknowledges that it 
has no interest in any literary work of a member of the staff unless special 
arrangement was made with the staff member concerned arising from financial 
assistance given by the University to assist in publication of a book." 
1 ' Under some circumstances, piracy of copyrighted material may even be 
optimal for the owner. For example, "turning a blind eye" to single, non-commer-
cial users who "pirate" a personal copy of software may create network externali-
ties, which then increases the value and willingness to pay on the part of commer-
cial purchasers who are easily monitored. See Slive and Bernhardt (1998). 
Some universities might make tidy sums merchandizing apparel and 
other products adorned with their logos. 
^ An analysis of some 230 profitable product and process innovations in 
Canada gives a rough estimate of the relative outlays necessary to commercial-
ize a product. "Basic research," in which universities may be assumed to spe-
cialize, accounts for only 3-4% of the total necessary to launch a new product 
or process. See Palda (1993, p. 55). The assistant vice president of technology 
transfer at the University of Toronto also gave this advice: "Be prepared to 
spend as much as $100,000 for a patent....and a decade before you get your 
product to market." Globe and Mail, October 22, 1998. 
The subject of commercialization of intellectual property will continue 
to receive increasing attention by universities. For example, the Association of 
Universities and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) organized, with Industry Canada, 
a symposium on intellectual property on November 26, 1998 in Ottawa. The 
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symposium theme, "Capturing the Benefits," is quite revealing of the current 
orientation of the university sector. 
15 Much of what follows in this section draws upon Part IV of Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992). 
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